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et al.: Gift or Loan of State Money

GIFT OR LOAN OF STATE MONEY
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11:
. [N]o debt shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of
the
No such
state unless such debt shall be authorized by lav ....
law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have
been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of all
votes castfor and against it at such election ....
N.Y CONST. art. VII, § 8, cl. 1:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid
of any private corporationor association, or private undertaking;
nor shall the credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of
any individual, or public or private corporation or association,
orprivate undertaking ....
N.Y CoNST. art. X, § 5:
Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at
any time be liable for the payment of any obligations issued
by... a public corporationheretofore or hereafter created, nor
may the legislature accept, authorize acceptance of or impose
such liability upon the state or any political subdivision thereof.
N.Y CoNsT. art VII, § 4(c):
Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, no county,
city, town, village or school district described in this section shall
be allowed to contract indebtedness for any purpose or in any
manner which, including indebtedness, shall exceed an amount
equal to ....
(c) the city of New York, for city purposes, ten per centum
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ALBANY COUNTY
1 16 7
Schulz v. State of New York
(decided July 27, 1993)

In a declaratory action, plaintiffs who were citizen-taxpayers
and residents of New York State1 168 claimed that several sections
of Chapter 56 of the Laws of New York1 16 9 violated article VII,

section 11,1170 article VII, section 8,1171 and article X, section
51172 of the New York State Constitution because the financing
1167. 156 Misc. 2d 169, 601 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1993).
1168. The court first examined plaintiffs' standing to challenge Chapter 56.
The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a statutory
financing scheme as taxpayers but did have the requisite standing by virtue of
their status as citizen-voters. Id. at 172-73, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
1169. 1993 N.Y. Laws 56. Section 1 of the statute provides in pertinent part:
"[Tihe legislature recognizes the need for continued investment in order to
restore our highway, bridge, transit, air and rail facilities to a state of good
repair and to enhance and improve such facilities to address current and
projected capacity problems." Id.
1170. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part:
[N]o debt shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the state,
unless such debt shall be authorized by law, for some single work or
purpose, to be distinctly specified therein. No such law shall take effect
until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people,
and received a majority of all the votes cast for and against it at such
election ....
Id.
1171. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8, cl. 1. This section provides in pertinent
part:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any
private corporation or association, or private undertaking; nor shall the
credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or
public or private corporation or association, or private
undertaking ....
Id.
1172. N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 5. This section provides in pertinent part:
Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at any time
be liable for the payment of any obligations issued by ... a public
corporation heretofore or hereafter created, nor may the legislature
accept, authorize acceptance of or impose such liability upon the state or
any political subdivision thereof.
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scheme contained in Chapter 56 violated the debt limitations
imposed by the Constitution. 1173 Plaintiffs also argued that the

financing scheme constituted a "taking" without due process of
law. 1174 Plaintiffs further sought a preliminary injunction
enjoining defendants, the New York State Thruway Authority

(Thruway Authority) and the Metropolitan Transit Authority
(MTA) from issuing any bonds pursuant to Chapter 56 of the
New York Laws of 1993.1175 The court held that the challenged
1176
provisions of Chapter 56 were constitutional on two bases.
First, the statutory provisions provided a creative method of
financing that furthers the public interest and thus, should be
accorded deference. 1177 Second, the legislature was empowered
with the authority to earmark funds for a public corporation to be
1178
used for a public purpose.
The legislation at issue provided for funds derived from

statewide gasoline taxes, supplemental petroleum taxes, highway
Id.
- 1173. Schulz, 56 Misc. 2d at 174, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 242. Chapter 56 provided
for allocation of funds from certain trust funds that were composed of revenues
from gasoline and transportation taxes. Id. at 171, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The
funds were to be used for the financing of transportation, bridge, and highway
projects. Id.
1174. Id. at 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244. Specifically plaintiffs alleged "that
funds 'otherwise available to reduce plaintiffs' taxes will be unconstitutionally
taken from plaintiffs and illegally used to pay the principal and interest on the
debt incurred by various state authorities.'" Id.
1175. Id. at 171, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
1176. Id. at 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
1177. Id. at. 176-77, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (quoting Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust
For Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d 358, 369-70, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1289, 413
N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (1978)). The Dorset court stated:
Courts are required to exercise a large measure of restraint when
considering highly intricate and imaginative schemes for public
financing or for public expenditure designed to be in the public interest.
Some may be highly controversial. But when a court reviews such a
decision, it must operate on the rule that it may not substitute its
judgment for that of the body which made the decision. Judges, however
much they might disagree with the act under review, are not free to
invalidate it on that ground.
Id.
1178. 156 Misc. 2d at 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
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use taxes and certain vehicle registration fees to be placed in a

highway and bridge trust fund (Highway Trust Fund) and a mass
transportation trust fund (Mass Transit Fund). 1179 Chapter 56
allocated revenues from these trust funds "for the financing of
mass transportation, bridge and highway projects." 1180 Under
this scheme, the defendants were "authorized to issue special
limited obligation bonds." 118 1 The bonds were to be paid from
the monies deposited in the trust funds.1182 These revenues were
"separate and apart" from other state funds, and further, no
money could be disbursed from the trust funds absent an
appropriation made by the New York State Legislature. 1183
Chapter 56 and other previously enacted legislation provided that
bonds issued by public authorities did not constitute a debt of the
state. 1184 The court found that the financing scheme was "'in
harmony with fundamental law' 1 185 and that the plaintiffs failed
to rebut, beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption thdit all
legislative enactments are constitutional.

1 18 6

Thus, the court

1179. Id. at 171, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
1180. Id.
1181. Id.
1182. Id.
1183. Id.
1184. Id. at 171-72, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The MTA argued that "the use of
state subsidies paid from the State's general fund to a public authority to secure
its bonds does not constitute a debt within the meaning of the Constitution so
long as payments are subject to annual appropriation by the Legislature." Id. at
173-74, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 242. The Thruway Authority countered that the state
would not be liable to bond holders because the bonds were not a debt of the
state and further, this was noted on the bonds. Id. at 173-74, 601 N.Y.S.2d at
243.
1185. Id. at 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244 ("No statute should be declared
unconstitutional if by any reasonable construction it can be given a meaning in
harmony with fundamental law.") (quoting People ex rel. Simpson v. Wells,
181 N.Y. 252, 257, 73 N.E. 1025, 1026 (1905)).

1186. 156 Misc. 2d at 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244 ("Legislative enactments
are presumed constitutional ....

While this presumption

is rebuttable,

unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.")
(quoting Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 475 N.E.2d 95, 98, 485
N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (1985)).
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granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact. 1187
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Wein v. City of
New York. 1 18 8 In Wein, plaintiffs alleged that legislation creating
the New York City Stabilization Reserve Corporation Act
(SRCA) 1189 was unconstitutional under article Vl 11 90 of the
New York State Constitution. 1191 The plaintiffs claimed that
SRCA was a "corporate government agency constituting a public
benefit corporation" and obtained its funds by selling bonds
"without a pledge of fall faith and credit of either the City or
State of New York." 1192 SRCA had been established by the
193
legislature in order to assist the city during a fiscal crisis. 1
The bonds issued by SRCA were neither a debt of the city nor
the state, nor would the city or the state be liable for any debts or
obligations of SRCA. 1194 Further, the bonds were payable only
out of funds appropriated to SRCA by the city. 1 195 Plaintiff, a
taxpayer, alleged that SRCA was unconstitutional because the Act
which created it permitted the City of New York to illegally
obtain additional revenues through the sale of bonds by a
corporation without extending its debt obligation beyond the limit
set by the State Constitution. 1196 The Wein court held that
1187. 156 Misc. 2d at 178, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
1188. 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
1189. Id. at 613-14, 331 N.E.2d at 515, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
1190. N.Y. CONST. art VII, § 4(c). This section provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, no county, city, town,
village or school district described in this section shall be allowed to
contract indebtedness for any purpose or in any manner which,
including indebtedness, shall exceed an amount equal to...

(c) the city of New York, for city purposes, ten per centum
Id.
1191. Wein, 36 N.Y.2d at 614, 331 N.E.2d at 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 552-53.
1192. Id.
1193. Id. at 614, 331 N.E.2d at 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
1194. Id.
1195. Id. at 615, 331 N.E.2d at 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
1196. Id. at 613-14, 331 N.E.2d at 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 556. Plaintiffs also
alleged that creation of SRCA violated article VII, § 2 because the city was
incurring debt without pledging its full faith and credit. Wein, 36 N.Y.2d at
618, 331 N.E.2d at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 557. Plaintiffs further argued that
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creation of SRCA was constitutional because the statute which
created it expressly provided that the city could not become
indebted through the issuing of bonds by SRCA. 1197 The court
further opined that should it become necessary for the city to
appropriate money to SRCA, if SRCA suffered a deficit in any
given year such appropriations would be deemed a
constitutionally permissible gift. 1198
An issue similar to that in Schulz and Wein was examined in
Comereski v. City of Elmira.1199 In Comereski, plaintiff, a

taxpayer residing in the city of Elmira, brought suit to invalidate
a contract between the city and the Elmira Parking Authority, a
public benefit corporation. 120 0 The contract provided that the
city, who owned and operated the city's parking meters, would
use a portion of its profits derived therefrom to offset any losses
that the Parking Authority might incur. 120 1 The court held that
while the city was prohibited from giving or loaning its credit to
a public corporation, it was not forbidden from making a gift of
its public funds to a public corporation established for a public
purpose.1202 The court reasoned that the legislative provisions
mandating that bonds issued by public authorities are not to be
considered a debt of the city nor payable out of city funds, were
not inconsistent with statutes or the contract at issue, which
permitted direct financial assistance in the form of a gift, from

SRCA violated article VII, § 1 because "the city would be loaning credit in aid

of a public corporation." Id.
1197. Id. at 618, 331 N.E.2d at 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The court

dismissed plaintiffs' argument under article VII, § 2 for the same reason. Id.
Regarding plaintiffs' argument under article VII, § 1, the court stated that
legislation which appropriates a gift from the city to a public benefit
corporation is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 618, 331 N.E.2d at 518-19,
370 N.Y.S.2d at 557. See also Comereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248,
125 N.E.2d 241 (1955) (holding that a city may make a gift of its public funds
to a public corporation for an appropriate public purpose).
1198.
1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.

36 N.Y.2d at 618, 331 N.E.2d at 518-19, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57.
308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955).
Id. at 250, 125 N.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 251, 125 N.E.2d at 242.
Id. at 252, 125 N.E.2d at 242.
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municipalities to public benefit corporations. 12 03 Consequently,
the Comereski court upheld the constitutionality of the

contract. 1204
In New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice, Inc. v.
Coughlin,1205 (hereinafter New York State Coalition) a similar

issue involving the extension of the state's credit to a public
corporation by way of indemnification was discussed.1206 In
Coughlin, the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, brought suit to
permanently enjoin defendants from issuing bonds to finance
prison construction, and to declare that the Prison Construction
Act, which authorized the New York State Urban Development
Corporation (UDC) to finance such construction, violated article
VII section 8, and article VIII, sections 1 and 3 of the New York
State Constitution. 1207 The relevant section of the act provided
that "'[t]he state shall and hereby agrees to indemnify and save
harmless the corporation from and against any and all
liability,....'"1208 The plaintiffs contended that this section
constituted a guarantee by the state to pay for the bonds if UDC
defaulted on those bonds and thus, it violated article VII, section
8 of the New York Constitution which prohibits a gift or loan of
the state's credit to a public corporation. 1209 The court, however,
held that the state did not have to provide an indemnity with
respect to the bonds and that the act did not violate the New York
State Constitution. 12 10 The court reasoned that although the
section in question was ambiguous and may have been interpreted
consistently with the plaintiffs contention, the act's purpose was
to "'indemnify UDC against,

. . .

any expenses or liability for

any claims related to the design, construction, reconstruction or
renovation of correctional facilities,'" not to indemnify UDC
1203. Id. at 253-54, 125 N.E.2d at 243.
1204. Id. at 254, 125 N.E.2d at 244.
1205. 103 A.D.2d 40, 479 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 660,
474 N.E.2d 607, 485 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
1206. Id.
1207. Id.
1208. Id. at 44, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
1209. Id.
1210. Id. at 45-46, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
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against defaulting on the payment of the bonds. 12 11 Therefore,
without finding indemnification with respect to the bonds, the
court upheld the constitutionality of the act. 1212
Subsequently, statutes that appropriated public funds to provide
immunity, defense, and indemnification of trustees and officials
of public corporations were upheld as constitutional. In Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Mack, 12 13 the plaintiffs were Long Island
Lighting Company (LILCO) and a resident of Freeport. 12 14 They
brought suit in their capacity as taxpayers to declare that the
exculpation and indemnification provisions of Public Authorities
Law violated article VII, section 8, of the New York State
Constitution. 12 15 These provisions excluded the trustees and
officers of Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), a public
corporation, from "any personal or civil liability" stemming from
the exercise of their powers "unless their conduct [was]
determined to constitute 'intentional Wrongdoing."' 12 16 The court
held that these provisions did not violate the New York State
Constitutional provision proscribing the state from giving or
loaning of credit to a public corporation. 12 17
The court stressed that although article VII, section 8, of the
New York State Constitution 12 18 was "designed to prevent the
state from acting as a surety or a guarantor of the debt of
others," the State may indemnify or assist a public corporation as
long as it was "'made pursuant to an appropriation which...
distinctly specif[ied] the sum appropriated and the object or
purpose to which it is to be applied.'" 12 19 The court reasoned
that because the funds to be used to pay the cost of
1211. Id. at 45, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (citing 1983 N.Y. Laws 56, at 2399
(Memorandum of State Exec. Dep't)).
1212. Id. at 45-46, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
1213. 137 A.D.2d 285, 529 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1988).
1214. Id. at 288, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
1215. Id.
1216. Id. at 287, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
1217. Id. at 287-88, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
1218. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
1219. Id. at 291-92, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 505-06 (citing Wein v. State of New
York, 39 N.Y.2d 136, 145-46, 347 N.E.2d 586, 590, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225, 22930 (1976)).
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indemnification were annually appropriated by the legislature
through "tax-raised revenues" which did not involve any
"borrowing by the state," these provisions did not "create a state
debt," award of a gift, or loan of state credit. 1220 The court
further noted that "the Legislature has determined that
indemnification statutes [were] necessary in order to attract
worthy persons to serve as public officials, especially when such
civic-minded individuals serve without compensation" 122 1 and
that "[w]ithout immunity and indemnification,... it would be
difficult to obtain the services of the required competent and
civic-minded trustees .... "1222 The court also stated that this
particular indemnification statute does not indemnify the trustees
and officers of LIPA for breach of fiduciary duty. 1223
Accordingly, the court upheld the constitutionality of the
indemnification provisions. 1224
With respect to the due process claim, the Schulz court held
that the legislature had clear authority to apportion funds to a
public corporation which was established for a public
purpose. 1225 Thus, the court concluded that the financing scheme
did not offend due process. 1226 Therefore, .a state may
constitutionally apportion part of taxes that are specified for use
by a public corporation created for a proper public purpose.
Further, allocation of such taxes will not be violative of due
process as a "taking."

1220.
1221.
1222.
1223.

137 A.D.2d at 294-95, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 507.

Id. at 292, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
Id. at 291, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
Id. at 294, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 507.

1224. Id. at 287-88, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
1225. Schulz, 156 Misc. 2d at 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 244.

1226. Id.
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